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This paper contributes to the sociological study of legitimation, specifically focusing 
on the state legitimation of torture and other forms of violence that violate                        
international normative standards. While sociologists have identified important               
discursive techniques of legitimation, this paper suggests that researchers should also 
look at state practices where concerns regarding legitimacy are “built in” to the very 
practice of certain forms of violence. Specifically, the paper focuses on surrogacy, 
through which powerful states may direct or benefit from the violence carried out by 
client states or other armed groups while at the same time attempting to appear                
separate from and blameless regarding any resulting human rights violations. The 
utility of this concept is demonstrated in case studies of torture in the U.S. “War on 
Terror,” examining the policy of extraordinary rendition and U.S. policy regarding 
Iraqi-state torture during its occupation of that nation. The case studies are developed 
from analyses of human rights reports, leaked military documents from U.S. soldiers 
in the Iraq War, and U.S. newspaper and television coverage.  
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 The vast majority of the world’s states have formally          
committed to the norm regarding the inviolability of the human          
person; that no person, in the words of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), should be “subjected to torture or to cruel,    
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” This norm is         
further expressed in the Geneva Conventions (1950) and again         
prohibited by the UN Convention Against Torture (1975), which bans 
any state acts that cause “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental” for the purpose of obtaining information, a confession, or for 
punishment. While the overwhelming majority of nations of the world 
have committed to this norm, torture remains a widespread and                   
frequently-used state practice (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009; Hafner-
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Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Rejali 2007). The United States is hardly an 
exception; U.S. officials instituted policies that directly used or relied 
upon torture during its “War on Terror,” despite longstanding U.S. 
commitments to treaties that prohibit and criminalize such practice 
(Hooks and Mosher 2005; McCoy 2006).1 This contradiction                      
therefore presents an important research puzzle: how is it that the 
U.S. has been able to both affirm the human rights of the individual 
not to suffer torture, but has simultaneously used or relied on torture 
as a means of accomplishing state goals? 
 Social scientists have begun to answer this question by          
identifying legitimating mechanisms U.S. officials have used to         
manage this contradiction between normative commitments and       
actual state practices. Most notably, researchers have pointed to       
rhetorical techniques, by which U.S. officials have sought to portray 
incidents of torture and abuse as “isolated incidents” committed by a 
few, low-ranking “bad apples,” that were in no way related to or 
caused by policies implemented at the highest levels of government 
(Hooks and Mosher 2005; Del Rosso 2011). This research paper adds 
to these accounts, and aims to contribute to a more general             
understanding of legitimation, by focusing on physical, or non-
discursive, tactics. This paper identifies one such legitimating tactic, 
surrogacy, by which U.S. policy-makers may benefit from a client state’s 
use of torture, while still maintaining distance from such acts and  
creating a more plausible deniability that the U.S. is responsible for 
any resulting violations of international norms. In this way, physical 
practices of legitimation do not exist separately from discursive         
techniques, rather they are often used in tandem with the rhetorical 
methods of legitimation more traditionally studied by sociologists. In 
the following paper, I will make this argument through an                         
examination of U.S. torture in the “War on Terror,” first taking a brief 
look at the U.S. policy of “extraordinary rendition” and then moving 
on to a more thorough investigation of Iraqi governmental torture 
during the U.S. occupation (through the years of 2004-2010). I will 
conclude by making an argument that surrogacy is frequently used by 
powerful actors who would like to both benefit from violent force 
while at the same time appear to be respecting international                      
humanitarian norms. For this reason, the concept may be of more 
general use to other researchers studying violence and human rights. 
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LEGITIMATION, EGREGIOUS VIOLENCE, AND TORTURE 
IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
 It is useful to begin a discussion regarding torture and state 
violence with a few definitions. In this paper I use the term 
“legitimate” to describe a state policy that does not appear to                       
contravene widely shared values, norms, and ideals (Johnson, Dowd, 
and Ridgeway 2006). Legitimation, on the other hand, is the cultural 
work and the particular strategies that state officials may utilize in         
order to (1) make state policies seem legitimate or (2) to prevent a 
public from gaining awareness of such contraventions (Freudenburg 
and Alario 2007). Of particular concern here, states must do                        
legitimation work for what might be called egregious acts of violence, 
or state policies that violate universal humanitarian norms, as                     
identified by major international human rights treaties, such as those 
outlawing the targeting of civilian populations in war, fighting “wars 
of aggression” for territory or resources, the use of prohibited forms 
of violence such as chemical weapons, or the use of torture. 
Like most sociological work studying legitimation in general, 
the study of state tactics to legitimate egregious violence has typically 
focused on rhetorical strategies. For instance, scholars have sought to 
understand how states may promote militaristic patriotism in order to 
justify military adventurism. According to Bacevich (2005), for                   
instance, members of the U.S. political elite promoted the idea, in the 
wake of the Vietnam War, that U.S. military power could be used to 
reshape the world—making it more free, democratic, and                         
prosperous—regardless of the fact that the actual use of military force 
toward such ends results in mass civilian deaths and other                         
humanitarian harms. Similarly, Bricmont (2006) warns that Western 
states are increasingly using human rights as a means to legitimate war. 
For instance, the U.S. war in Afghanistan has been legitimated as              
being fought to liberate the Afghani people—particularly women—
from the reprehensible human rights practices of the Taliban,                         
regardless of the fact that many U.S. allies in Afghanistan have equally 
poor human rights records (Bricmont 2006). 
Also in this vein of research, sociologists examine other                 
discursive strategies of legitimation by pointing to state attempts to 
use mass media to cultivate fear within their domestic citizenships as a 
means of justifying wars. For example, Altheid and Grimes (2003) 
3
Bonds: Indirect Violence and Legitimation: Torture, Surrogacy, and the U
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012
E. Bonds/Societies Without Borders 7:3 (2012) 295-325 
~298~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociólogos Sin Fronteras, 2012 
show how the U.S. government used the threat of terrorism to                     
legitimate its 2003 invasion of Iraq. And sociologists further study 
how states may attempt to promote racist thinking to legitimate state 
violence, by for instance promoting notions that “enemies” are                
barbarous, inferior, or otherwise less than human and are therefore 
not deserving of the rights and protections that might otherwise be 
granted (Dower 1993; Hooks and Mosher 2005; Horseman 1983; 
Steuter and Wills 2008). 
Other social scientists have paid more attention to rhetorical 
strategies of denial as a means by which egregious acts of violence 
may be legitimated. Most important of these is the tactic of 
“interpretive denial,” as identified by Cohen (2001), by which state 
officials may acknowledge certain instances of violence but attempt to 
define or classify them in such a way that they cannot be considered 
breeches of widely accepted normative codes. Typically, this is done 
when officials use euphemisms and technical jargon to refer to the 
death and destruction caused by war, a technique Bourke (2006:29) 
aptly describes as the use of “the language of civility employed in the 
art of killing.”  A prime example is the term “collateral damage,” used 
to refer to civilian deaths in bombing campaigns. The goal here,               
according to Arendt’s (1963/1994) analysis of Nazi “language 
rules”—whereby mass murder was called the “final solution,” 
“evacuation,” and “special treatment”—is not so much to deny the 
reality of events, so much as to prevent their association with                      
traditional normative prohibitions against murder. When it works as a 
legitimating tactic, then, interpretive denial achieves a disassociation 
that stifles public awareness that certain forms of state violence may 
be interpreted as violating universal humanitarian norms and values, 
even if members of the public are in some way or another cognizant 
of the state’s use of such violence and its outcomes. 
Like sociological studies of egregious violence more generally, 
most who have studied the legitimation of U.S. torture policies in the 
“War on Terror” are primarily concerned with rhetorical and                      
discursive techniques. Hooks and Mosher (2005), for instance, explain 
that one tactic U.S. officials used in attempts to legitimate torture at 
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq was to insist—successfully, it should be 
said—that the press not refer to it as “torture” at all, but to instead 
call it “abuse.” Moreover, U.S. officials also used rhetorical                  
4
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legitimating techniques by insisting that the acts of torture depicted in 
photos from the U.S. run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were committed 
by a few, low-ranking, “bad apples,” and were not the necessary result 
of policies initiated at the highest level of government (Hooks and 
Mosher 2005). Similarly, Del Rosso (2011) points to U.S. officials’ 
processes of ignoring and neglecting reports of widespread torture 
and abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan so that the torture exposed at the 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq could be constructed as an “isolated                  
incident.” 
 These studies make important contributions to the                        
understanding of the legitimation of torture and other forms of                  
egregious state violence. But it is important to note that by focusing 
on discourse alone, the studies may overlook the full context of                 
legitimation, especially the ways acts may be legitimated through their 
very practice, and the ways that such practices may work in tandem 
with rhetorical strategies. In one important exception, Rejali (2007) 
documents the rise of what he calls “clean torture” or “stealth               
torture,” such as the use of stress positions, sensory deprivation,                 
electrocution, and other means of torture that do not leave lasting 
physical evidence on the bodies of victims. Such techniques can be 
used, according to Rejali (2007:3) to “beat a suspect senseless without 
leaving a mark,” making them doubly effective because they allow 
states to more easily evade the attention and criticism of human rights 
organizations and other groups that threaten to impose democratic 
accountability. Moreover, they may make subsequent governmental 
attempts at interpretive denial more plausible and potentially more 
effective, as when, for instance, U.S. officials named their own                  
program of clean torture in the “War on Terror” policies of 
“enhanced interrogation.” 
 This paper attempts to contribute to the study of the                   
legitimation of U.S. torture, and egregious acts of state violence more 
generally, by focusing on another physical tactic: that of surrogacy. 
Through this legitimating tactic, I propose that officials are able to 
direct, or rely upon, a client state or an armed group to carry out     
egregious acts of violence that accomplish shared goals. In regard to 
the legitimation of U.S. acts of egregious violence, surrogacy may be 
used for three primary reasons. First, because violence is carried out 
by another party rather than U.S. soldiers, it may be less noticed and 
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less likely to be constructed as a social problem by members of the 
U.S. public. Evading attention and suppressing public awareness is, to 
Freudenberg and Alario (2007:147), the “dark side of legitimation,” 
and surrogacy may be one useful tool toward its achievement. Second, 
and in a related way, surrogacy can be used to limit public awareness 
of the details and/or the extent of such violence, as it is directly                 
undertaken by armed groups or states that act in secrecy and typically 
refuse to share information that might otherwise be forthcoming by a 
state in a more democratic society like the U.S. Finally, surrogacy may 
be useful because it can provide U.S. officials the capacity to more 
plausibly deny responsibility for any violations of international                    
standards committed by its adjuncts, even if such violence furthers the 
geopolitical strategy of the United States. The use of surrogacy as a 
method of legitimation-in-practice is evident in the U.S. policy of 
“extraordinary rendition.” 
  
TORTURE, SURROGACY, AND EXTRAORDINARY                       
RENDITION 
 An obvious place to begin an examination of the legitimating 
tactic of surrogacy during the U.S. “War on Terror” is the                         
government’s policy of “extraordinary rendition,” by which U.S.                     
officials have abducted terrorist suspects in foreign counties and 
transferred them to third-party states known for their use of torture 
(see Amnesty International 2006; Grey 2005; Mayer 2008).2 
“Rendition” first became U.S. policy in the Reagan era, in which it was 
used on a very limited basis to capture suspects in foreign countries 
and transport them to another country with an outstanding arrest       
warrant (Mayer 2008). Though more overtly used in the 1990s,                   
rendition was strictly controlled and primarily used to disrupt terrorist 
networks and bring suspected terrorists to justice (Grey 2007). After 
the terrorist attacks committed against the U.S. on September 11th, 
2001, however, these controls were relaxed and the tactic was much 
more broadly employed (McCoy 2006). This new “extraordinary                
rendition,” however, was not used to bring suspects to trial, but in 
order to “render suspects outside the reach of the law” (Mayer 2008: 
108). The Bush Administration officials that made the decision to    
expand the use of rendition were, at the time, arguing more broadly 
that the U.S. was “fighting a new kind of war,” in which a “high         
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premium” should be placed “on the ability to quickly obtain                       
information from terrorists and their sponsors in order to prevent 
further atrocities against Americans” (Gonzalez 2002:2). Evidently in 
pursuit of this goal, suspects in ensuing years were transferred by U.S. 
officials to Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya, and 
Yemen, all of whom have faced international criticism for torture and 
abuse (Amnesty International 2006; Grey 2005).  
It can reasonably be assumed that once a suspect who is              
presumed to possess high-value intelligence is transferred into the 
custody of another government with a reputation for routine torture, 
he or she will become subject to such violence as well (Amnesty              
International 2005). We certainly know that individuals who were 
transferred from U.S. custody to third-party nations through                   
extraordinary rendition, but have since been released, have reported 
that they were tortured, including being beaten, electrocuted,                      
subjected to psychological torture, and being held for long periods in 
grave-like isolation cells (Amnesty International 2006; Mayer 2008; 
Perlez, Bonner, and Massood 2009).3 Based on these persons’                   
accounts, it can safely be presumed that all—or at least most—
individuals captured and delivered via extraordinary rendition have 
been tortured as well. Of course, the exact details of what these 
“rendered” persons have experienced once they were handed over by 
the U.S. to other governments that practice torture can rarely be               
determined, which is presumably one of the reasons why such persons 
were transferred into their custody in the first place. 
Taking all this together, during the “War on Terror” U.S.                
officials may have used extraordinary rendition as a legitimating tactic 
in order to transfer detainees to countries where they would face             
interrogation methods that would be illegal in the United States while 
(1) preventing the American public from becoming broadly aware of 
the outcomes of such policies, (2) protecting U.S. intelligence agencies 
from judicial oversight, and (3) providing officials an increased ability 
to deny that the U.S. is responsible for any resulting contraventions of 
humanitarian norms that may eventually come to light. In terms of 
secrecy, the U.S. government refuses to disclose exactly how many 
people have been subject to extraordinary rendition (Amnesty                    
International 2006). Moreover, the states where persons have been 
transferred via extraordinary rendition, according to Amnesty              
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International (2005), practice torture in secrecy while also                         
systematically denying its use and making other misrepresentations 
about its practice. Consequently, surrogacy may be used as a                       
legitimating tool because it shrouds U.S. policies in darkness,                        
preventing civil society organizations and the public as a whole from 
becoming more fully aware of their consequences.  
Additionally, officials have invoked “state-secrets privileges” 
as a means of blocking lawsuits from former detainees that were                
subjected to extraordinary rendition and, more generally, as a means 
of preventing judicial oversight of the program (Savage 2009).4 In so 
doing, the U.S. government claims that all such trials must be                   
dismissed because they would divulge intelligence-gathering methods 
or otherwise harm national security. U.S. federal courts have accepted 
these arguments, and as a consequence no victims of torture and               
extraordinary rendition have had a day in a U.S. court (ACLU 2011a; 
New York Times 2011). By invoking a “state-secrets” defense, the 
U.S. government has not only acted to protect officials from criminal 
and civil penalties, but in order to legitimate its interrogation and              
torture program by suppressing information and keeping the issue 
from becoming a matter of greater public concern. 
 Finally, extraordinary rendition may work as a legitimating 
tactic because it can allow state officials the capacity to subject                
suspects to abusive forms of interrogation, while also allowing them 
to more plausibly deny responsibility for any resulting breaches of 
international norms. In this way, a discursive tactic of legitimation 
(denial), is closely coupled with the physical practice of transferring 
prisoners. For this reason, the U.S. government claims it obtained 
“diplomatic assurances” from the countries co-operating with its               
extraordinary rendition policies that no detainee will be tortured or 
mistreated (New York Times 2007). While such assurances may be 
useful discursive means for dodging responsibility, they likely provide 
very few actual human rights protections when they come from         
countries (1) with well-known policies of torture, (2) that are known 
to give false statements regarding their treatment of prisoners, and (3) 
when such assurances do not accompany any meaningful oversight by 
civil society organizations (Amnesty International 2005). 
 Through this brief exploration, it becomes clear that the U.S. 
has utilized more than discursive strategies in order to legitimate its 
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policies of the treatment of suspects in the “War on Terror.” Rather, 
the U.S. government has recently used the practice of “extraordinary 
rendition” as a means to subject prisoners to harsh treatment that    
often matches international definitions of torture, while at the same 
time shrouding this treatment of suspects with secrecy to limit public 
awareness and prevent judicial oversight. The tactic may also be               
beneficial because it can be closely coupled with rhetorical strategies 
of legitimation by allowing officials to more plausibly deny that they 
are responsible for any resulting torture because such acts were not 
directly committed by U.S. agents. Rights advocacy organizations        
estimate that hundreds of people have been subjected to extraordinary 
rendition by the U.S. government (ACLU 2005; Amnesty                         
International 2006a). The next section examines another form of               
surrogacy used to legitimate torture in recent years, this one affecting 
far more people. 
 
TORTURE, SURROGACY, AND THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF 
IRAQ 
 The United States launched an invasion of Iraq in March of 
2003 in order to depose its ruling regime and, through occupation, 
reorder the Iraqi government to more favorably suit U.S. economic 
and geopolitical interests (Chandrasekaran 2006, Muttit 2011; 
Schwartz 2011). During its occupation, officially over in 2011, the 
U.S. worked to suppress an insurgency and sectarian conflict through 
its own military power and through the military power of the Iraqi 
army and security forces, which the U.S. built-up and armed (Metz 
2007). It is now widely known, thanks to the work of international 
human rights organizations and the leak of U.S. military reports from 
the war, that the fledgling Iraqi government frequently practiced                
torture. In this section, I will provide an overview of the extent of this 
torture. Next, I will consider the extent to which the U.S. government 
was responsible for, or derived benefit from, the systematic abuse of 
Iraqi prisoners. The answer to this question is directly related to the 
tactic of surrogacy and the argument at hand regarding physical               
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The Extent and Nature of Iraqi Torture During the U.S. Occupation 
 By 2005, it became public knowledge that the Iraqi                 
government, including both its military and police forces, were                  
routinely practicing torture. Human Rights Watch, for instance,                
reported that it had interviewed ninety current or former Iraqi                   
detainees, seventy-two of whom alleged that they had been tortured 
(Human Rights Watch 2005). Later in 2005, U.S. military forces closed 
down two Iraqi-run secret prison, in which detainees were being 
starved and were subjected to other forms of torture (Wong 2005).5 In 
2006, Amnesty International (2006b:2) issued another warning,                   
stating that, “Iraqi authorities are systematically violating the rights of 
detainees in breach of guarantees contained both in Iraqi legislation 
and in international law and standards—including the right not to be 
tortured and to be promptly brought before a judge.” Despite these 
warnings, the United States continued to build-up, assist, and closely 
co-operate with Iraqi military forces. Throughout this period, the U.S. 
maintained an implicit policy tolerating this abuse, which was—
according to human rights reports and leaked military documents—
unrelenting. As recently as 2010, Amnesty International (2010:32)    
reported that detainees, particularly those who are government critics 
and suspected insurgents, face such torture as, 
 
Rape or the threat of rape. Beating with cables and 
hosepipes. Prolonged suspension by the limbs. 
Electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body. 
Breaking of limbs. Removal of toenails with pliers. 
Asphyxiation using a plastic bag over the head. 
Piercing the body with drills. Being forced to sit 
on sharp objects such as broken bottles. 
 
An analysis of hundreds of thousands of leaked military documents, 
known as the “Iraq War Logs,” shows the extent of the torture that 
was taking place in Iraq, while also showing U.S. troops’ familiarity 
with its practice. 
The Iraq War Logs, released by the organization known as 
Wikileaks, is a large database of more than 390,000 “significant               
actions” reported by U.S. soldiers stationed in Iraq between January 1, 
2004 to December 31, 2009 (Wikileaks 2010). “Significant actions” 
10
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reported by U.S. troops may include firefights with enemies, the               
discovery of corpses or wounded persons, raids made on suspected 
insurgents, arrests and detentions, and instances of the observed or 
alleged abuse of detainees. I conducted a search in this database using 
the term “detainee abuse,” which produced 786 results that were 
spread fairly evenly throughout the five-year period.6 
 It is possible that the number of abuse reports, at 786, is 
higher than the actual incidence of reported abuse because there may be 
duplicates, or multiple reports that refer to one single incident of                
torture or abuse.7 And many of the reports are very terse and vague, 
providing no details, so it is impossible to know if it refers to another 
incident reported elsewhere in the logs. For these reasons, it is               
impossible to determine an exact number of incidents of reported 
abuse. However, a reading of these logs indicates that there are                   
undisputedly several hundred unique incidents of reported torture or 
mistreatment.8 Despite these cautions, the reports of abuse in the Iraq 
War Logs likely severely underestimate the total number of incidents                
observed by U.S. troops in Iraq. For instance, because abuse of                   
prisoners was regularly practiced by at least some Iraqi security forces, 
it likely became normalized to at least some U.S. soldiers, who                   
therefore may have deemed such acts undeserving of being reported 
as “significant events.” Furthermore, reporting these incidents                   
involves work that some U.S. service members simply may not have 
carried out, especially in light of the many other responsibilities they 
had and traumas they may have experienced in wartime. Finally, it is 
possible that some service members may have felt that suspected               
insurgents deserved abuse, and/or were in fact complicit in the abuse 
of Iraqi prisoners, and so would not have taken action to report                   
incidents of mistreatment.    
 So, while the Iraqi War Logs are incomplete and imperfect, 
their records do establish, taken alongside the human rights NGO 
reports, that Iraqi security forces regularly practiced torture                   
throughout the 2004-2009 period of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and 
that, furthermore, U.S. military officials were well aware of this                     
torture. Most of the reports issued about the abuse are extremely terse 
and tell us little about its nature. The vast majority of reports from 
2008 say, for instance, 
11
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Reported an allegation of detainee abuse involving 
security force. Details of the alleged abuse have 
been sent via separate correspondence. Allegation 
has been forwarded to the appropriate command 
for initiation of inquiry/investigation (4/8/2008, 
Log # 346432). 
 
 Many reports do, however, include some descriptions and 
provide a limited understanding of Iraqi security forces torture and 
mistreatment of detainees. Typical incidents of abuse committed by 
Iraq security forces, as described by U.S. soldiers in the Logs, involve 
beatings, kickings, and stress positions, as the below reports indicate:9 
 
 Evidence of prior torture/abuse on 3 local nationals that 
had been captured... Examinations of the detainees 
showed lacerations on wrists from handcuffs, bruising on 
the back and thighs, bruising on face. Detainees allege 
that they were beaten by police with cables on the back, 
chest and face; hung by the wrists and forced to confess 
to terrorist acts (5/29/05 Log#87757). 
 
 Detainee claims that Iraq Police placed him in a stress 
position (left arm curled behind back, right arm curled 
over shoulder) and locked him in the station bathroom. 
Iraq Police beat the detainee in the bathroom. At some 
point, they also took him upstairs... to another room, 
where they beat him some more. The detainee’s body 
showed extensive bruising on the face, detainee back 
shows what appears to be a boot print, outlined in 
bruised tissue (5/27/2006, Log #153717). 
 
 Detainee alleges three [Iraq security officials] came to his 
house and beat him... Patient has marked signs of trauma, 
had bleeding from a laceration in the left eardrum,                
bilateral bruising and swelling around the face and eyes 
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 [Detainee] claimed that he was beaten by Iraqi Police... 
The detainee stated that he was punched, kicked and 
struck with a wire. A physical examination of the detainee 
revealed bruising on his left ear, neck and back 
(10/8/2008, Log #374668). 
 
 [Detainees claim] they were beaten with cables and had 
their feet stomped on by the Iraqi Police. [Medical                
personal] evaluated the detainees and determined that 
their wounds were consistent with their story of the 
abuse (5/16/2009 Log #2055). 
 
The above reports show, year-by-year, typical incidents of abuse                 
committed by Iraqi security forces, as recorded by U.S. soldiers in the 
Iraq War Logs. According to the Logs, Iraqi forces sometimes                
combined these beatings with electrical shock, burns from cigarettes 
or cigars, and other brutal acts.  
 
Iraqi State Torture and the U.S. Occupation 
 Iraqi security forces were committing widespread torture 
from 2004 to 2009. This torture, according to the Iraq War Logs and 
human rights organization reports, showed no sign of diminishment 
over the years. All of this torture occurred in a context in which the 
United States was an occupying power that had created and supported 
the Iraqi government, closely coordinating its own military actions 
with that of its new client state. In this section of the paper, I seek to 
understand the extent to which this torture and abuse can be                      
considered surrogate U.S. violence. In order to do so, I explore two 
further questions: (1) to what extent did the U.S. attempt to stop this 
torture? and (2) to what extent might the U.S. have benefited from it?  
One way to begin answering the question about U.S.                    
culpability is to examine what efforts the U.S. made to confront and 
end Iraqi state torture, and to consider the extent that it was tolerated. 
In doing so, it is important to differentiate between the actions of   
individual U.S. soldiers and U.S. policy as a whole. There is evidence 
in the Logs, after all, that individual U.S. officers and soldiers sought 
to intervene when they suspected abuse or torture, and that they                   
otherwise tried to act in the interest of protecting detainees’ human 
13
Bonds: Indirect Violence and Legitimation: Torture, Surrogacy, and the U
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012
E. Bonds/Societies Without Borders 7:3 (2012) 295-325 
~308~ 
© Sociologists Without Borders/Sociólogos Sin Fronteras, 2012 
rights, as the following experts indicate: 
 
 There is evidence of torture in a holding cell at [an] Iraqi 
Police station... Large amounts of blood on the cell floor, 
a wire used for electrical shock and a rubber hose were 
located in the holding cell... Team is conducting visits to 
the Iraq Police [Station] and the detention cells have been 
checked during every subsequent visit... The detention 
cell officers have been counseled on the severe negative 
ramifications to relations with the coalition forces if            
human rights are not respected (6/26/2006, Log 
#160351). 
 
 Discovered multiple detainees who appeared to have 
been abused by Iraqi Police personnel. The detainees had 
severe XXX to lower extremities and were in need of 
medical attention. Some detainees were handcuffed in 
offices, others beaten and confined to locked rooms and 
left in a XXX state with no fluids provided. The unit also 
discovered the suspected instruments used to conduct the 
abuse in the office of the Iraqi Police Station Chief. 
These suspected tools of torture had blood marks and 
were retained by the unit... When the Iraqi Police Chief 
was confronted about the suspected detainee abuse at his 
station he responded he was aware of the [torture] and 
supported it as a method of conducting investigations 
(5/22/09 Log #838). 
 
In other examples, individual soldiers acted to protect the human 
rights of Iraqi detainees: 
 
 Iraq Army soldiers apparently struck detainees. A US   
Marine instructed the [interpreter] to tell the Iraq Army 
members not to [hit] the detainees (3/19/2006, Log 
#138802). 
 
 At an Iraqi Checkpoint, the subject detainee assaulted a 
soldier from Iraqi Army and fled. Iraqi Army personnel 
14
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chased the detainee, and when Iraqi Army [soldiers] 
caught him, they began striking the detainee. [U.S.]           
Marines intervened and took the detainee to their                  
emergency medical provider. While being treated... an 
Iraqi Army soldier unexpectedly entered the emergency 
medical provider and kicked the detainee in the back. 
Again the Marines intervened and they removed the Iraq 
Army soldier... (8/16/2006, 1725758). 
 
When U.S. officers and soldiers acted to stop the abuse of Iraqi                 
prisoners, they were acting in accordance with public statements made 
by U.S. commanders who insisted that the U.S. would not tolerate the 
practice of torture in Iraq (DoD 2005). 
Perhaps the biggest intervention made by U.S. forces in the 
interest of human rights occurred in December of 2005, when the 
Army’s Major General John Gardner proclaimed, after torture                  
committed at Iraqi secret prisons came to light, that “we will not pass 
on facilities or detainees [to the Iraqi security forces] until they meet 
the standards we define and that we are using today” (quoted in 
Schmitt and Shanker 2005). Such a policy constituted a real                       
intervention on behalf of human rights, but was, unfortunately, short-
lived. Only a few months later the U.S. government announced plans 
to turn over U.S.-run prisons to the Iraqi state, including the                       
notorious Abu Ghraib detention facility (Worth 2006), despite little 
improvement in the human rights practices of the Iraqi security                  
forces.10 
The Iraq War Logs show, in fact, that while some individual 
U.S. officers and soldiers did intervene on behalf of the human rights 
of detained Iraqis, they more typically took no action to halt abuse 
and torture. The Logs show many instances, for instance, when                  
soldiers reported that prisoners would remain in Iraqi custody despite 
evidence they were being tortured: 
 
 32 detainees were dropped off by Iraqi Army to the             
Diyala Provincial Jail. While the detainees were waiting 
outside to be processed, members of [U.S. Armed                 
Forces] noticed that 10 detainees showed signs of                   
bruising and scarring. Several of the victims stated that 
15
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they were abused by the Iraqi Army while being                       
detained... 5 detainees showed signs of significant abuse... 
(multiple XXX, bruises, and broken bones)... Are                         
currently in Iraqi Police Custody at Diyala Provincial Jail 
(10/4/2006, Log #187753). 
 
 Inspected the Major Crimes Detention Center at the 
Fallujah District Iraq Police Station and discovered                
instance of detainee abuse... A physical screening of the 
detainee revealed severe bruising on his back and either a 
dislocated or severely sprained wrist. The detainee stated 
that his hands were tied behind his back and he was hung 
from the ceiling. He also states that while he was hanging, 
Iraqi Police Captain hit him numerous times on his back 
with a ruler... The detainee’s wrist was splinted... and he 
was returned to the [Iraqi Police run] Major Crimes               
Detention Center (4/29/2008, Log #350633). 
 
In other instances, records indicate that U.S. troops actually 
interrogated Iraqis after they were beaten by Iraqi soldiers or 
other security officers: 
 
 Detainee was arrested at his home. The Iraqi Army                 
soldiers asked for the location of his brother. He told 
them that he [did not] know and was placed in the trunk 
of a [car]. While being put in the trunk he was struck with 
a baton several times in the XXX, right leg, right wrist, 
and buttocks. Detainee shows swelling on his XXX, 
bruising on his right arm, leg, and buttocks. There are 
indications of abuse. Detainee has been medically cleared 
for interrogation (5/13/2009, Log #1792). 
 
 Upon medical screening the detainee revealed... he was 
struck several times after capture. The detainee [said] that 
he was kicked and punched in the right shoulder by... 
Iraqi Forces... There was bruising and limited range of 
motion in his right shoulder. The detainee appears to be 
in overall good health and has been deemed fit for                  
16
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interrogation (7/23/2006, Log # 166927). 
 
A great many reports of abuse in the Iraq War Logs simply 
state “no further investigation necessary.” This is consistent with two 
military orders issued by U.S. commanders, which were revealed with 
the release of the Iraq War Logs. “Fragmentary Order 242,” issued in 
April of 2005, instructed troops that, “provided the initial report                
confirms US forces were not involved in the detainee abuse, no              
further investigation will be conducted unless directed by                         
headquarters” (quoted in Stickler and Woods 2010, see also Davies 
2010).11 Fragmentary Order 039, issued in April 2005, modified                 
Fragmentary Order 242 by requiring that “reports of Iraqi on Iraqi 
abuse be reported through operational channels,” but still stipulated 
that “provided the initial report confirms the U.S. forces were not 
involved in the detainee abuse, no further investigation will be                   
conducted unless directed” (quoted in Stickler and Woods 2010, but 
see also Iraq Log #90847). 
These orders indicate a contradictory U.S. human rights               
policy, in which U.S. commanders required soldiers to inform them of 
instances of Iraqi abuse, but simultaneously ordered soldiers not to 
investigate the abuse or take further action unless specifically told to 
do so. This discrepancy is an outcome of the broader contradiction in 
U.S. policy regarding torture and abuse in Iraq. On the one hand there 
is the publically stated policy of insisting that the Iraqi state respect 
human rights and not practice torture, along with the provision of 
human rights training programs and other forms of instruction to                
Iraqi security forces. On the other hand, U.S. officials throughout the 
2004-2009 period knew very well about torture and mistreatment 
committed by Iraqi forces but nonetheless worked closely to build 
them up, to support them—cooperating on a daily basis—and to 
eventually give them control of the entire territory. So while the U.S. 
government publically insisted that the Iraqi government respect            
international human rights law, in practice it tacitly condoned torture. 
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Iraqi Torture as Surrogate U.S. Violence 
 When the Bush Administration invaded Iraq in 2003, it had 
little expectation that it would face insurgent violence that would so 
effectively challenge U.S. rule, and was consequently ill-prepared to 
respond (Chandrasekaran 2006; Metz 2007). The insurgency and                
sectarian conflict that erupted in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion 
proved to be too much for U.S. military forces to suppress alone in 
Iraq, at least not without straining and/or sacrificing other global               
military commitments (Metz 2007). The Bush Administration                   
responded with a counterinsurgency strategy that aimed to create large 
and effective Iraqi security forces, utilizing them to defeat the                    
insurgency and maintain control over the territory (National Security 
Council 2005; Metz 2007). A 2005 U.S. National Security Council 
(2005) report describes the implementation of this strategy:  
 
In August 2004, there were five Iraqi army                       
battalions in the fight; now more than 120 Iraqi 
army and police battalions are in the fight... In 
June 2004, no Iraqi Security Force unit controlled 
territory. The Coalition provided most of the              
security in Iraq. Today, much of Baghdad                        
Province is under the control of Iraqi forces, the 
cities of Najaf and Karbala are controlled by Iraqi 
forces, and other Iraqi battalions and brigades 
control hundreds of square miles of territory in 
other Iraqi provinces. 
 
According to a U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute analysis, “by the 
autumn of 2005, U.S. strategy increasingly left neutralization of home-
grown insurgents to Iraqi security forces” (Metz 2007: 53). 
 It is for this reason that the United States is, to some degree, 
responsible for the torture committed by the Iraqi state. U.S. military 
strategy depended upon Iraqi forces to defeat the country’s insurgency 
and sectarian conflict in order to achieve broader U.S. geopolitical 
goals. In its counterinsurgency and sectarian war, the Iraqi state found 
it necessary—or at least advantageous—to use torture.12 This torture 
then was committed by the Iraqi state to secure its own interests along 
with those of the United States.13 The U.S., in other words, cannot               
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easily separate itself from the torture committed by its adjunct.
 U.S. officials would nonetheless try to distance themselves 
from this torture and otherwise deny that the United States shared any 
responsibility. This is to say that, by denying responsibility for their 
client state’s use of a contested form of violence, even though it was 
used to secure key U.S. interests, these officials were practicing the 
legitimating technique of surrogacy. In this respect, the practice of 
surrogacy is often some combination of physical and rhetorical                   
techniques. Rather than ending its close cooperation with a                       
government that regularly practiced torture, and upon whom the U.S. 
was dependent, U.S. officials continued building up the Iraqi                    
government’s military capacities while—at the same time—insisting 
that they were not responsible for any of its egregious violence, even 
if committed to achieve shared goals between the two governments. 
For instance, a U.S. “senior military official” told a New York Times 
reporter, in regard to Iraqi state torture, that “in the end, this is an 
Iraqi war, and the Iraqis will fight it in their own way" (quoted in 
Burns 2005), never mind that the U.S. began the war with its invasion 
and took a stake in it by building up one side of a sectarian conflict. 
Similarly, in a 2005 response to a press inquiry regarding Iraqi detainee 
abuse, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told a reporter that Iraq is a 
sovereign nation and that,  
The United States does not have a responsibility 
when a sovereign country engages in something 
that they disapprove of; however, we do have a 
responsibility to say so and to make sure that the 
training is proper and to work with the sovereign 
officials (DoD 2005). 
 
More recently, in an attempt to deflect U.S. responsibility from the 
Iraqi torture documented in the Iraq War Logs, President Obama’s 
spokesperson told reporters, “If there needs to be an accounting, first 
and foremost there needs to be an accounting by the Iraqi                         
government itself, and how it has treated its own citizens” (quoted in 
al Jazeera 2010). 
In summary, the Iraqi security force’s systematic torture of 
prisoners occurred in a context where the United States government 
19
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was training and equipping the Iraqi state; was closely cooperating 
with it to conduct military operations; and was increasingly dependent 
upon it to prevail over insurgents and sectarian fighters to achieve 
U.S. foreign-policy goals. Nevertheless, through the legitimating              
technique of surrogacy, the U.S. has sought to distance itself from 
these acts of violence that violate international humanitarian                      
standards. But does surrogacy work? This question will be explored in 
the next section, which compares U.S. media coverage of “torture 
events” during the U.S. occupation of Iraq. 
 
Torture, Surrogacy, and U.S. News Media Coverage 
Contrary to conventional understandings, torture was widely practiced 
in Iraq, well beyond the singular incident of Abu Ghraib, which 
grabbed extensive news headlines around the world. Beyond Abu 
Ghraib, torture was widely practiced by U.S. forces (Del Rosso 2011; 
Hooks and Mosher 2005) and—as human rights reports and the Iraq 
War Logs show—by the Iraqi government itself. While U.S. forces 
began taking public measures to stop the kinds of torture and abuse 
that took place at Abu Ghraib and other U.S.-run prisons, Iraqi                   
torture continued unabated throughout the occupation. This torture, 
however, was not well publicized, preventing Iraqi torture from being 
broadly constructed as a social problem in the U.S. This is significant 
because, without strong public pressure, the U.S. government had 
much less an incentive to intervene in a meaningful way to put an end 
to it. 
This point can be demonstrated in a comparison between 
three “torture events” in U.S.-occupied Iraq: the discovery of torture 
and abuse committed by U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison; the 
discovery of two separate Iraqi-run torture prisons in November and 
December of 2005; and the release of the Iraq War Logs, which              
included records, as shown in this paper, of systematic torture                   
practiced by the Iraqi government. All of these events provided               
evidence of similarly cruel and shocking acts of violence committed 
against prisoners. And all three show evidence that the torture was 
widespread and impacted large numbers of persons. Despite these 
similarities, only the torture at Abu Ghraib received extensive                       
coverage in the U.S., as Table One shows. 
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 Based on an analysis of news coverage from major U.S.  
newspapers and major U.S. television networks, the discovery of              
systematic torture at Abu Ghraib—in which U.S. soldiers were               
depicted in photographs committing a range of psychological and 
physical methods of torture—received vastly more attention than the 
other torture “events” in Iraq.14 Like the photos from Abu Ghraib, 
the discovery of two Iraqi-run torture prisons also revealed very brutal 
and systematic torture against Iraqis; where prisoners were reportedly 
being starved, severely beaten, burned, mutilated, and killed (see 
Knickmeyer 2005; Knickmeyer and Fekeiki 2005; Wilson 2005). These 
incidents, however, received dramatically less media attention than the 
torture at Abu Ghraib. Likewise, while the Iraq War Logs gave                 
evidence of torture just has brutal, and more extensive, than that               
depicted in the Abu Ghraib photos, it received even less attention 
from mainstream news organizations than the revelations about the 
secret Iraqi torture prisons. 
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 Of course, some of the extreme difference in coverage is due 
to the fact that the evidence of the Abu Ghraib torture was in                  
photographic form, which made it particularly shocking and                   
newsworthy in the U.S. Textual descriptions of equally atrocious acts 
may not, after all, have the same impact as photos. However, there are 
likely other important factors that combined to produce such              
extremely disproportionate news coverage. First, the United States 
news organizations likely found the torture directly committed by U.S. 
soldiers more newsworthy than that committed by their Iraqi                   
counterparts, even if all such torture was committed to achieve shared 
U.S.-Iraqi state goals. Second, the torture committed by U.S. forces 
also received much more attention because it triggered multiple               
hearings and investigations, which continued to generate media                   
attention in subsequent weeks and months. Revelations of Iraqi                
torture did not, however, receive nearly the same official investigative 
attention, which translated to much less media attention. Finally, the 
torture committed by U.S. soldiers could not be shrouded in nearly 
the same secrecy as that committed by Iraqi forces. Many specific   
details of the torture committed by the Iraqi government have been 
much more difficult for members of the Western media to uncover, 
and consequently remain largely unknown and unreported, at least in 
the U.S. 
 The consequence is that Iraqi torture during the U.S.                  
occupation became a kind of surrogate violence used to achieve 
shared political goals. But because this torture was not committed    
directly by U.S. soldiers, it received little media attention in the U.S. 
and, consequently, it remained of little concern to most Americans. 
For this reason, surrogacy is not only a means through which violence 
is applied, but also a legitimating mechanism that reduces the                      
likelihood that state acts of egregious violence will be vigorously              
opposed by domestic publics. Before closing, it is important to point 
out that, with the U.S. war in Iraq over, these are not merely historical 
concerns. On the contrary, a recent United Nations report                         
documenting the systematic torture of suspected insurgents and        
members of the Taliban by the national government created and                 
installed by the United States in Afghanistan means that issues of               
torture and surrogacy remain an ongoing concern (UN 2011).15 
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DISCUSSION: SURROGACY AND EGREGIOUS VIOLENCE 
 This paper aims to help explain what might be called the           
human rights/torture paradox: while states commit to normative               
conventions that outlaw torture, they nonetheless continue to                   
regularly use this universally condemned form of violence (Hafner-
Burton and Ron 2009; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007).                          
Sociologists have mostly sought to solve this problem by focusing 
on discursive technics of legitimation, by which officials may seek to 
justify, deny, minimize, or distance themselves from egregious acts 
of violence. Along with examining these important rhetorical                  
techniques, I argue social scientists should also attend to the ways 
that legitimating tactics may be “built into the act” of certain forms 
of egregious violence themselves. For this reason, I argue that social 
scientists should consider surrogacy as a type of legitimating                  
mechanism, by which powerful states may direct and/or benefit 
from acts of egregious violence carried out by client states or armed 
groups. To the extent that surrogacy can work as a legitimating                         
tactic, it may: (1) prevent domestic publics from becoming aware of, 
or associating a beneficiary-government with, acts of egregious                
violence; (2) limit judicial oversight and investigations from other 
governmental bodies, and/or (3) make a beneficiary-government’s 
rhetorical strategies of denial more effective because it can remove 
itself, even if only in a very superficial way, from the actual conduct 
of such violence. 
I made this case through an examination of torture in the 
U.S. “War on Terror,” during which U.S. officials used methods of 
violence that fall outside international normative conventions, while, 
at the same time, they also sought to cultivate an appearance that the 
government’s use of violence was conducted in a way that respects 
international norms; in a word then, they sought to ensure that it 
would be broadly deemed legitimate. Juggling these two conflicting 
desires—that for the use of unmitigated violence and that for                   
legitimacy—presents a real dilemma for U.S. officials. One way that 
they have sought to negotiate it, I have argued, is through the tactic 
of surrogacy.  
 The concept of surrogacy, as a legitimating mechanism, is 
likely applicable outside the “War on Terror.” It may be of use to 
understand powerful nations’ use of proxy violence more generally. 
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Endnotes 
1. Specifically, the United States ratified the United Nations                        
Convention Against Torture in 1994, by which the Senate made the 
treaty legally binding in the U.S. In implementing the treaty, the                  
Senate specified that “whoever outside the United States commits or 
attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or                        
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both…” (see 18 USC § 
2340A). 
2. Importantly, many have argued that such transfers are in violation 
of both international and Federal law. The United Nations                         
Convention Against Torture (1975) specifically states that “No State 
Party shall expel, return, or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture.” U.S. Federal Law (18 USC § 2340A) 
not only criminalizes torture, but also conspiracy to commit torture. 
3. Binyam Mohamed, for instance, is an Ethopian citizen and legal 
resident of the UK. He was arrested in Pakistan, where he was                   
transferred to CIA custody and again transferred to Morroco—where 
he was subjected to torture—and then taken again into U.S. custody, 
after which he was finally released back to the UK (Savage 2010). 
Likewise, Mamdouh Habib is an Australian citizen who was abducted 
by U.S. officials in Pakistan and then flown to Egypt—where he was 
beaten, burned with cigarettes, and electrocuted—before being                 
transferred again into U.S. custody and eventually released (Bonner 
2005). Muhammad Saad Iqbal is a Pakistani citizen who was arrested 
in Indonesia, transferred by the CIA to Egypt—where he too was  
tortured—and then transferred again to U.S. custody and eventually 
returned back to Pakistan (Perlez et al. 2009). Maher Arar is a                         
Canadian citizen whose family moved from Syria when he was 17. He 
was arrested at the John F. Kennedy Airport and taken to Syria, via 
Jordan, where he was beaten, tortured, and held for almost a year in a 
very small solitary confinement prison cell (CCR 2007). 
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4. For instance, Khaled El-Masri is a German citizen with no                       
connection to terrorist groups, but was abducted from Macedonia by 
CIA personal and flown to Afghanistan, where he was transferred to 
an Afghani jail where he was interrogated and tortured. He was                  
eventually flown to Albania by the U.S. government, where he was 
released. In 2006, his lawsuit against the U.S. government was                    
dismissed after it invoked a “state-secret” defense (ACLU 2011b). 
Likewise, a case seeking civil penalties from a Boeing affiliated                   
company for allegedly transporting prisoners to countries known for 
torture, on behest of the CIA, was dismissed in 2007 when the U.S. 
government intervened by invoking “state-secret privileges” (ACLU 
2011a). 
5. High-ranking Bush Administration officials were clearly aware of 
this torture, as they were asked to comment on it by reporters at press 
conferences (see DoD 2005). 
6. The public interest research organization, Bureau of Investigative                  
Journalism, conducted its own survey of this data, using other search 
terms, and identified more than 1,300 incidences of detainee abuse 
reported in the Iraq War Logs (Stickler and Woods 2010). 
7. Furthermore, one incidence of abuse may sound very much like      
another. 
8. Though as another cautionary note, it must be pointed out that 
some of these reports were documenting detainee’s allegations that 
they were abused, even when U.S. service members found no specific 
evidence of abuse. 
9. I have made some changes to these excerpts to make them more 
readable by, for instance, using entire words instead of military                 
acronyms and filling in a blank space or redacted portion of the                
report, indicated by brackets [...]. Three Xs (XXX) indicate a blank or 
redacted word or phrase I did not fill in for fear of inaccuracy. 
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12. Governments may practice torture for three main reasons: (1) as 
an attempt to extract information or confessions from individual                
detainees, (2) to impose order in understaffed prison systems, or (3) to 
shock and terrify insurgent or potentially insurgent populations (see 
Rejali 2007). A reading of the Iraq War Logs and relevant human 
rights NGO reports indicates that the Iraqi government was practicing 
torture to achieve all three of these goals. 
13. This is different than other historical situations in which the                   
United States intentionally sought to benefit from the terrorizing               
violence committed by client states during the Cold War era, for               
instance through the torture and assassination program called                     
Operation Phoenix in the Vietnam War (Valentine 1990) or through 
U.S. counter-insurgency efforts in Central America during the 1970s 
and 1980s (Chomsky 1985; Harbury 2005; McCoy 2006). 
14. This analysis is based on LexisNexis Academic databases of four 
major American Newspapers as well as the Vanderbilt Television                
Archive—using the following search terms: “Iraq and torture” and 
“Iraq and abuse”—for month-long periods after each event. 
10. Some of the prisoners initially tortured by Iraqi officials at a secret 
prison, who were removed by U.S. soldiers, were returned to Iraqi 
custody during the transfer of Abu Ghraib, where international                 
observers feared they would again be subject to torture (Sabir and 
Chamberlain 2006), and where the Iraqi government quickly began 
conducting mass executions (Poole 2006). 
11. The Iraq War Logs file I used for this research has been redacted, 
such that these individual order numbers were removed. Journalists 
with files of the Iraq War Logs that have not been redacted identified 
fragmentary numbers 242 and 039 (see Davies 2010; Stickler and 
Woods 2010). 
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15. The UN (2001) investigation included interviews of 273 persons 
detained by Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security and found 
nearly half had been subjected to torture, used as a means to extract 
information and confessions. Some of these detainees were                      
transferred into Afghani custody by international military forces.                 
According to the report, “Detainees described experiencing torture in 
the form of suspension… and beatings... Electric shock, twisting and 
wrenching of detainees’ genitals, stress positions including forced 
standing, removal of toenails and threatened sexual abuse were among 
other forms of torture that detainees reported. Routine blindfolding 
and hooding and denial of access to medical care in some facilities 
were also reported” (UN 2011: 3). 
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